# Confrontations in War and Peace[1]

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## Abstract

Every campaign or engagement is both a physical conflict and a psychological confrontation. The psychological confrontation is won when the other party submits to our will – i.e., we change their intent. The psychological confrontation is won because our physical attack is convincing. Commanders at one level conduct physical attacks to support their superiors' psychological confrontations. The Gulf War illustrates how we may win the physical conflict while failing to win the psychological one. All wars are confrontations, if only from the ultimate political/diplomatic perspective. However, the particular circumstances of a war will indicate which level of the hierarchy of command should be conducting the psychological confrontation rather than the physical attack. As a general rule, the more operations tend toward peacekeeping, the lower the level of command engaged in confrontation rather than physical action. The examination of the particular circumstances is done through Confrontation Analysis. Confrontation Analysis has until now, if at all, been applied to Peace Operations. Its information requirements differ from those required for conflict. Now that operations are conducted across a wide spectrum of circumstances, commanders at the appropriate level need to be served by a Command and Control (C2) system that includes the support of Confrontation Analysis so as to link their psychological approach to the physical action or threat.

## Introduction

Before the commencement of the bombing campaign in Operation Desert Storm, a US Air Force general called on Ambassador James Akins, a former diplomat who knew

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[1] An electronic version (PDF) of this paper is available, along with related articles, via the dramatec website (http://www.dramatec.com).

Saddam Hussein and Iraqi politics. The ambassador naturally asked whether he wanted to draw on his political knowledge. "Oh no, Mr. Ambassador," said the general. "This war has no political overtones." He only wanted targeting information [1].

That was the task he had been given, and he was right to concentrate on it. Nevertheless, his comment indicates a gap in the way we think about war. Every war or military operation has political overtones. Clausewitz famously analyzed the nature of "absolute" war, in which nations defend their very existence. He pointed out, "Under all circumstances, War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument…[and] the first, the grandest and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and the General exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages."

Warriors must be willing and able to fight. That is their profession. But they, or those who direct their actions, must also be able to understand the political nature of each operation and pursue its political aims.

This was always a requirement of the high command – i.e., those who stand on the interface between statesmen and generals; the political and military. However, in today's operations, this interface is defined according to the circumstances rather than by the predetermined hierarchy, which leads to a political role for lower-level commanders.

Our intention is to set out a framework for understanding the spectrum of tasks today's commanders undertake, and to suggest a methodology, Confrontation Analysis, to help them in tasks where knowing how to fight is not enough…

**A unified theory of war**

Over the years, our institutions of governance have developed an understanding that when two states or alliances confront one another, and cannot resolve the matter by diplomacy, then either the confrontation continues, e.g., the Cold War, or an inter-state conflict follows, e.g., the Falklands War. In the latter case, depending on the conflict's size, nature and what is at stake, the adversaries fight a campaign or campaigns, battles and engagements. The objective of both sides is to impose its will by force of arms; to destroy, take or hold.

If the confrontation continues, as a stand-off or with continuing diplomacy, each side seeks to gain its desired outcome by changing the other's intention. Forces may be deployed, rather than *em*ployed, to this end. Cold War activities exemplified such strategic level confrontations. The theory of deterrence, the need for credible threats, evident resolve and so forth – all indicate that the objective was to modify intentions rather than to impose one's will by force. The objective was political. The military deployed forces to support its achievement. In contrast, the objective in the Falklands War was military – liberate the Falklands. The military employed force to destroy the Argentinean forces and take the islands.

more ◄── degree of emphasis on confronting ──► less

| | Peace operation Confrontation | Fighting Conflict |
|---|---|---|
| Nations, states and/or alliances | (Diplomatic) Confrontation | (N/A) |
| Strategic | Confrontation | War |
| Theater | Confrontation | Campaign |
| Tactical | Confrontation or fight | Battles and engagements |

*(vertical labels: "Change intent" spanning Strategic/Theater; "Change intent or destroy" at Tactical; "Destroy" on the right side)*

Information ordered
in terms of
- Intent
- Capabilities
- Timing
- ROE

Information ordered
in terms of
- Time
- Space
- Amount
- Effect

**Figure 1: Types of operation – the continuum from Peace Operations to fighting**

Increasingly, we find that our modern operations, particularly those labeled "Peace Support" or "Crisis Response" operations, concentrate on changing intentions – bringing various parties into compliance with the norms and standards of the international community. This results in commanders having to consider political, in addition to military, objectives in order to determine which should have dominance, and in which circumstances. As a general rule, in a peace support operation, force is employed only at the tactical level, and often only in self-defense. Thus, all commanders above this level tend to be pursuing the political, rather than a military, objective – they are conducting a confrontation (see Figure 1).

In operations on the left side of the diagram, results are determined mostly by the parties' psychological factors – specifically, the credibility of threats and promises. We are saying, "Comply in these specific ways, and these good things will happen. If you don't, this is what'll happen". For operations to the right of the diagram, the primary determinant is physical.

At the left of Figure 1, where psychological confrontation predominates, physical activities are important mainly in sending messages from one side to the other – adding to, or detracting from, the credibility of threats and promises.

Conversely, on the right, physical use of fighting assets to destroy enemy assets is the primary factor determining the outcome of the battle of wills. Each side is saying to the other, "I'll fight you until you give in". The main emphasis is on the complex business of asset destruction and preservation, which determines the result.

The diagram shows the aim of each type of operation at each level – to change the other party's intent, or destroy its fighting capacity. Even at the lowest level of confrontation, there is potentially a task of destruction at the tactical level – e.g., in

shooting a terrorist or self-defense. When no such potential task exists, there is no longer any need for an armed presence. While this need exists, we must not forget that war is always absolute at the level of the warrior whose task is destruction – win or lose. At this level, there is no room for half-measures.

In practice, and holding Clausewitz in mind, it is necessary for the General to recognize where he, and his command, stand in relation to the schematic in Figure 1 in the context of his particular circumstances at any given time. Is he conducting a confrontation? If so, with whom, to what purpose, and what deployments of force, actual or threatened, are required to support his aims? Or is he involved in a conflict? In this case, how does he employ force to best advantage, but at least cost?

Commanders conducting confrontations have different information needs from those directing a conflict (see at the foot of each column in Figure 1).

- In conflict, the commander needs information that is essentially objective and calculable. In confrontations – when the task is to change intentions – the information he needs tends to be subjective and judgmental.

- In conflict, the commander directs and co-ordinates the actions of subordinates who carry out the destructive actions. In a confrontation, the commander himself conducts the action – albeit often as a member of a civil-military team. This applies to commanders at all levels in a peace support operation. The corporal facing someone at checkpoint who insists he must pass is conducting a confrontation.

- In a confrontation, the commander is generally his own best source of information and intelligence, since he is the one in contact with the parties. Thus, there is a tendency for information flows to be reversed – instead of the commander being informed of the situation by his staff, *he* informs *them*!

To illustrate, and to contrast the nature of confrontations and conflicts, two military examples are explored – the Gulf War and Bosnia 1995.

The Gulf War illustrates how a military campaign may achieve complete success in physical terms while failing, at another level, as a confrontation [2]. It appears that, prior to taking Kuwait, Saddam believed either that there would be no US military action or that he would defeat the US if they counter-attacked. Subsequently, the US formed a coalition and confronted Saddam on the Kuwait/Saudi border. This caused Saddam to change his intention, or not to form one, of exploiting south. However, it appears he did not believe that the US would attack him, despite their massive preparations to do so – at least not until five days before the onset of war, by which point it was too late for compromise. In spite of the build-up and intense diplomatic measures, the pressure on Saddam was inadequate. The confrontation had failed to change his intention of holding Kuwait – i.e., the coalition had failed to convince him that what was threatened was worse than holding Kuwait. A conflict followed, Desert Storm was launched and Kuwait was liberated.

With victory, the coalition reverted to a confrontation. However, there was now a failure to recognize that, by failing in the confrontation over liberating Kuwait and having to fight for it, the situation had been altered in three respects –

1. the coalition was now in a much stronger position militarily;
2. Saddam's hold on power had been weakened;
3. in order to generate the political will within the democracies to fight, Saddam himself had been "demonized".



**Figure 2: Conflicts and confrontations – The Gulf War and Bosnia 1995**

Ever since that point of victory, the US and its allies have been in confrontation with Saddam as they try to modify his behavior – yet they were never in a better position to do this than in March 1991. Figure 2 (solid arrows) illustrates this progression. You can be sure that the sudden change from conflict to confrontation, with its different information requirements, objectives and analytical demands, was not recognized in Schwartzkopf's HQ. More importantly, when he sat down to negotiate the cease-fire in that tent on the Kuwait/Iraq border was it recognized by those in distant capitals who had been on the political-military interface all along?

Our second illustration concerns the use of air strikes and artillery to coerce the Bosnian Serbs into negotiating an end to hostilities in Bosnia in 1995. The UN and the Bosnian Serbs had been in confrontation over the Safe Areas for some time, and the UN threatened the use of NATO air strikes if heavy weapons were used against the enclaves. This confrontation strategy failed, the threat was carried out and the Bosnian Serbs responded by taking hostages. At one point in May 1995, following air strikes near Pale, they held 375 hostages. Given the sensitivity of Western public opinion, the UN could not withstand this pressure.

During the summer of 1995, the situation was changed by the UN steadily withdrawing its vulnerable units and building up a force that threatened the Bosnian Serbs' ability to fight their Muslim and Croat enemies. The will to do this was reinforced by the Bosnian Serb atrocities at Srebrenica and Zepa, which had the effect of stiffening Western resolve to act. Thus, when confrontation over the Safe Areas occurred again, in early September, the ensuing conflict was successful in lifting the siege of Sarajevo and adding to the pressure which brought the Serbs to negotiate – i.e., brought them into a confrontation which led to the signing of the Dayton Accords. Figure 2 contrasts Bosnia 1995 (dotted arrows) against The Gulf War via the framework given in Figure 1.

It can be seen, from the argument summarized in Figure 1, that a "confrontation perspective" provides us with the opportunity to develop a **unified theory** of military operations. Confrontations and conflicts can be understood as elements of an evolving strategy in support of the ultimate political confrontation. In the next sections, we will begin to formalize the notion of a confrontation, and show how commanders can employ the approach called Confrontation Analysis to win their confrontations.

### First illustration – Operation Desert Storm

Confrontation Analysis provides a mathematically derived framework and toolset for representing, analyzing and conducting confrontations. The details of the approach are illustrated through the two "real life" examples used already.

| | def | IR | US | $f_1$ | $f_2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IRAQ** | | | | | |
| quit Kuwait | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| quit Kuwait except for Bubiyan-Raudhatin | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| invade Saudi Arabia | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| **US** | | | | | |
| form coalition against Iraq | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| deploy in Saudi Arabia | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| defend Saudi Arabia | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| bomb Iraq | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| blockade Iraq | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| freeze Iraqi assets | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| launch ground attack | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |

**Figure 3: Confrontation preceding Desert Storm**

Figure 3 shows a **card table** representing the confrontation between Iraq and the US prior to the launch of Desert Storm. Iraq and the US held a number of **cards,** or yes/no policy options – such as Iraq's option to "quit Kuwait". The *possibility* that any of these cards could be "played" or "not played" allowed them to be used as levers through which the parties could manipulate the confrontation. This is the essence of Confrontation Analysis.

The column **def** in Figure 3 shows the **default future** at this time – i.e., the future that would continue unless present actions/policies changed. Iraq was refusing to quit Kuwait. It was even rejecting the option of quitting most of Kuwait while retaining the Northern island of Bubiyan and the oilfield of Raudhatin – an option that might have split the coalition and weakened its resolve. On the other hand, it was not

invading Saudi Arabia – a choice that was feared by the coalition. Meanwhile, the US, joined by other Arab and European nations, had formed the anti-Iraq coalition, and had deployed in Saudi Arabia to defend that country. It had not yet started bombing Iraq, nor launched a ground attack, but had instituted a blockade and frozen Iraqi assets abroad.

At this point diplomatic pressure on Iraq to quit Kuwait appeared to be intense. The pressure was aimed at getting Saddam to accept the US **position** shown in column **US**. If he did not, Iraq would suffer the effects of the US **fallback** strategy, which is shown by the cards in the US part of column $f_1$. Saddam, however, resisted this pressure, holding out for the position in column **IR**.

Why did he hold out? Firstly, he believed the threat against him, the fallback future in column $f_1$, would not materialize. Instead he believed that *another* fallback future, column $f_2$, in which no ground attack would be launched, was all he had to fear. Secondly, he believed that if a ground attack took place, column $f_1$, the result would be a US defeat, from which he would emerge with most of his military force intact, gaining prestige and achieving his ambition of dominating the Gulf. In sum, whether there was a ground attack or not, he believed he would eventually obtain something like his position at column **IR**.

In terms of Confrontation Analysis, this meant that the US had both a "threat" and a "deterrence" **dilemma** – its threat against Iraq was not believed and was in any case insufficient to deter Saddam from holding on to Kuwait.

As a result of the dilemmas facing the US, the pressure on Iraq, despite appearances, was in fact inadequate. Focusing internally on estimates of the physical effects of an attack on Iraq, and keeping these estimates secret for good military reasons to do with conflict, tended to obscure the lack of pressure. What was needed was to not only maximize these effects, but to change Saddam's opinion about them.

This was not done, and Operation Desert Storm had to be launched.

**Main and Contingent Objectives**

At this point another Confrontation Analysis error, of long-term significance, was made. The political decision to pursue the Main Objective by military means, to turn from confrontation to conflict, was not accompanied by the understanding that by achieving the goal in that way, the Main Objective had been irrevocably abandoned; as victory in conflict would result in a new political situation.

We should clarify these terms. The **Main Objective** in a confrontation is to secure others' consent to, and implementation of, our position. However, this is generally not possible without recognizing the risk of having to pursue the fallback future, meaning the future in which we carry out our fallback strategy or threat. This was well recognized in Cold War deterrence theory, where it was clear that maintaining nuclear peace required an active acceptance of the possibility of a nuclear war.

Carrying out a fallback strategy is, in general, very different from implementing our Main Objective. It therefore requires the formulation and pursuit of a different objective – the **Contingent Objective**. The more considered, focused, credible and acceptable our Contingent Objective, the less likely we are to have to pursue it in place of our (preferred) Main Objective.

It is therefore an error, albeit not one made by the Gulf allies, to refuse to think about, or plan for, the Contingent Objective. This refusal makes the fallback strategy less credible and therefore more likely to have to be carried out.

The other error is not to plan for the new confrontational situation that follows after the Main Objective has been irrevocably given up in favor of the Contingent Objective. Yet this is what happened in Operation Desert Storm. Even after the operation had been launched, the US political objective was stated as being the same as their pre-war Main Objective – i.e., simply to get Iraq to quit Kuwait.

It had, however, become impossible to pursue such a simple political objective. There was a basic reason for this, which is explained by Confrontation Analysis.

Launching the operation had required the US and its allies to overcome their own "threat" and "inducement" dilemmas – i.e., their disinclination to undergo the risk and expense of a ground war. Overcoming these dilemmas had required a change in their attitude toward Saddam as leader of Iraq. It had required an enormous propaganda and attitudinal change in the direction of "demonizing" Saddam – i.e., representing him as terribly wicked compared to either himself before the war, when his actual crimes were just as bad, or to leaders in China or Syria, whose crimes were at least as bad.

This profound change in attitudes meant that it had become impossible to pursue any political objective toward Iraq that did not involve removing Saddam.

This became apparent soon after the war [2,3]. It should have become apparent earlier had the question been asked. No questions were asked about any policies connected with the Contingent Objective – the future to be pursued through fighting a ground war. All policies continued to be premised on the now foregone and excluded future that had been the Main Objective.

The reason for this is said to be a fear of breaking up the anti-Iraq coalition [4]. Any coalition is a mix of partners with varied interests. Its objectives, preferences, attitudes and beliefs result from internal confrontations or collaborations between the coalition partners. Nevertheless, the coalition as a whole, not the party that is leading it, needs to be prepared to pursue a Contingent Objective. It is necessary for the coalition leadership to ensure that it is prepared to do so. The analytical error we are concerned with in this instance is that this did not happen. It is the result of this failure to think about post-war policy that made Operation Desert Storm a physical success but a confrontational failure.

|  | IR | CO | KW | f |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IRAQIS** | | | | |
| hand over prisoners, dead bodies | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| release civilian hostages | ✗ | ~ | ✓ | ✗ |
| keep within cease-fire boundaries | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| give information about mines | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| cease fixed-wing flights | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| cease helicopter flights | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| **COALITION** | | | | |
| cease attacking and advancing | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| interdict fixed-wing flights | ~ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| move Kuwati border northward | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |

**Figure 4: Cease-fire negotiations, February 1991**

Figure 4 shows the negotiations that took place at the end of the operation, when the coalition's ability to influence the future of Iraq was at its maximum [4]. These negotiations concentrated on low-level considerations concerning implementation of a ceasefire – where it was quite easy to obtain Iraqi compliance.

|  | IR | CO | f |
|---|---|---|---|
| **IRAQ** | | | |
| agree our cease-fire conditions | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| surrender Saddam for trial | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| pay compensation to Kuwait | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| renounce claims over Kuwait | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| cease development of WMD | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| **COALITION** | | | |
| take Basra | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| support and defend Shia rebels | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| take Baghdad | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| support/defend Kurdish rebels | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| aid Iraqi reconstruction | ~ | ✓ | ✗ |

**Figure 5: Confrontation that might have taken place following The Gulf War**

If the new confrontational situation that came with victory had been planned for in advance it seems likely that the position set out in Figure 5 could have been obtained. That is, rather than see Basra, or even Baghdad, taken, with coalition forces acting to defend rebellions of Shias and Kurds against Sunni rule, the Iraqis would have been willing and able to yield up Saddam for trial as a war criminal, give up all claims to Kuwait, and undertake to pay compensation and cease the development of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraqi representatives would, no doubt, have taken up the position shown in column **IR**. It would have been necessary to make them see that unless the coalition's terms were met, the fallback strategy (or significant parts of it) would be pursued – that is, the coalition advance would continue with dire results for Sunni rule over Iraq. But at that time such a threat could easily have been made credible. Had it been made credible, the overthrow of Saddam by the military would have been more achievable,

given the disorganization brought about by military defeat and successful rebellions in the North and South, than at any later time.

This proposition is speculative. What seems more certain is that –

- the ability of Iraqi generals to overthrow Saddam was greater then than it has been since;
- if politicians had asked "What should be our policy toward post-war Iraq?" the answer set out in column **CO**, the coalition's position, of Figure 5 would have been obvious and;
- Iraqi Sunnis would have preferred column **CO** to column **f**, the fallback future, and would have believed this time in the coalition's determination to pursue its Contingent Objective if the confrontation failed.

Post-event discussion of these questions has tended to ask "Should we have gone on to Baghdad?" The question is misleading.

The question focuses exclusively on the new Contingent Objective, column **f** in Figure 5, neglecting the new Main Objective – i.e., attainment of the position shown in column **CO**. Here, Saddam is put on trial and Iraq returns to reasonable behavior without much more military action than was actually undertaken. It is achieved by being *prepared* to go on to Baghdad – but being *prepared* for this is precisely what should have made it unnecessary!

## Second illustration – Bosnia 1995

Operation Desert Storm was primarily oriented towards the destruction of enemy fighting capability. Our second example – the hostilities in Bosnia during 1995 – provides an opportunity to explore the analysis of a confrontation, albeit one accompanied by considerable tactical destruction.

|  | SE | UN | f |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SERBS** | | | |
| attack enclaves | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ |
| withdraw heavy weaponry from enclaves | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| take hostages | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| **UN** | | | |
| use air strikes against Serbs | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |

**Figure 6: Confrontation over enclaves, Spring 1995**

Figure 6 shows, in simple terms, the nature of the recurring confrontations between the UN force and the Bosnian Serbs over the Safe Areas. The situation was in fact more complex than portrayed; other players, Bosnian Croats, FRY, NATO and the Contact Group Nations were all involved.

Given the sensitivity of Western public opinion, it was impossible for the UN to adhere to its position when the Serbs took 375 hostages. The fallback future in column **f** forced us to give in to the Serbian position, column **SE**. Using the terms of Confrontation Analysis, the UN could not withstand the "inducement dilemma" they faced – i.e., they preferred the position of the other party to the threatened fallback future.

|                                          | SE | UN | f |
|------------------------------------------|----|----|----|
| **SERBS**                                |    |    |   |
| attack enclaves                          | ✔  | ✕  | ✔ |
| withdraw heavy weaponry from enclaves    | ✕  | ✔  | ✕ |
| **UN**                                   |    |    |   |
| use artillery against Serbs              | ✕  | ✕  | ✔ |
| use air strikes against Serbs            | ✕  | ✕  | ✔ |

**Figure 7: Confrontation over Safe Areas, Fall 1995**

When UN troops were withdrawn from vulnerable positions, in the summer of 1995, the Serbs were deprived of the card "take hostages", leaving the situation shown in Figure 7. And with the addition of the Rapid Reaction Force, and in particular its artillery, the UN force had an additional capability to engage Bosnian Serb weapons; they added the card "use artillery against Serbs". Now the UN had a clear preference, and a more effective capability, for column **f**, the fallback future, over **SE**, the Serbian position, and were under no pressure to give in to the Serbs.

They, on the other hand, had always preferred the UN position, **UN**, to **f**. They had been able to hold out against us because they knew the UN were under greater pressure than they, but the anger with which they had reacted to air strikes showed how much they suffered from them. The reason why they could hold out against the UN, and not vice versa, was that they possessed greater political will, being engaged in a fight for national survival.

However, when the confrontation failed again at Sarajevo in September, and conflict resulted, the UN were no longer under pressure to give in – the Bosnian Serbs were forced to accept the UN position. The longer they remained in conflict with the UN and NATO, the weaker they became in relation to the other players. In Confrontation Analysis terms, they could not withstand the combination of an "inducement" dilemma and a "deterrence" dilemma. The siege of Sarajevo was lifted and ultimately the Dayton Accords were signed.

## Command and Control for confrontations

Having looked at two examples of elementary Confrontation Analysis, consider how the approach can be used to improve command and control of confrontations. This is needed particularly in Peace Operations where, as Figure 1 shows, the main effort lies mostly in confronting.

We have said that every operation is a confrontation when considered at the appropriate level – e.g., at national/international or grand strategic level, even total war is a confrontation. The ultimate objective in using military force is always to resolve a confrontation. However, certain operations – e.g., Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and current operations in Kosovo – are launched only after military force has been used, in order to ensure implementation of the resulting political settlement.

The military task in such Peace Operations is essentially the same as that faced by a force that, having forced the enemy to submit, must occupy the territory it has won. The objective is first and foremost to confront non-compliant parties and get them to comply without further use of force – though use of force is required as an option or Contingent Objective. Having achieved the Main Objective, the military can withdraw and hand over to civilian agencies. As a result, the military, Non-Governmental

Organizations and other key organizations must collaborate, to varying degrees, throughout the confrontation; that is the essence of a Peace Operation.

The main effort of the commander therefore lies in confronting, not in conflict – though his force must be ready to fight, should the need arise, in which case, of course, his main effort shifts to conflict. As his mission develops and becomes successful, the likelihood of having to fight lessens.

The problem with present approaches to command and control of such operations lies in a tendency to continue to use systems, tools and terminology appropriate only to conflict.

This confuses matters in several respects. The metaphorical application of fighting terminology to the business of confronting non-compliant parties –

- Obscures the need for actual, non-metaphorical fighting readiness.
- Alienates necessary civilian coalition partners. As a Peace Operation becomes successful, military commanders increasingly take subordinate, though essential, roles in a civil-military coalition led by civilian agencies. Using fighting terminology compounds the difficulty of joint planning with these partners.
- Misrepresents the commander's task. Psychological confrontation needs to be seen as a valid part of a commander's task, requiring appropriate organizational support.

Just as we need new terminology for conducting confrontations, we also require new tools. Maps are the essential tool for conflict. Before warriors had reliable maps, it was impossible to coordinate large-scale operations in the manner we do now. But maps are not the most appropriate tool for organizing and displaying the data used in confronting non-compliant parties – for this we require a new display of different information. Card tables are the maps of a confrontation; the card table displays the data that results from Confrontation Analysis. Such use of card tables to store and organize information is analogous to the use of maps in intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

For Confrontation Analysis to become an effective part of modern military operations it needs to be woven into the fabric of the military Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. The remainder of this section sketches a vision of a Confrontation Analysis-based C2 infrastructure – a vision that is slowly being realized through on-going research by the authors.

It is noted that a successful Confrontation Analysis C2 system would draw on advances in doctrine, training and organization, where we are also attempting to ensure that progress is made. However, we illustrate the "end product" of this cultural transformation in an attempt to demonstrate the practical application of the concepts.

**Figure 8: Confrontation Analysis Command and Control system**

Figure 8 provides an overview of our Confrontation Analysis C2 system. Two separate C2 systems are used – one internal to the military, the other an external system. Both systems are run and maintained by military staff, who select and screen information and intelligence before inputting it into the external system. This preserves the security of information to do with conflict.

In each system, information about confrontations is presented in the form of interactive card tables. These are card tables viewed on a computer screen that can be "clicked" at any point to bring up information about the selected element – e.g., a player, a card, a position or fallback strategy (threat).

Both proposed systems – internal and external – are designed to operate over existing communications infrastructures – secure military e-mail for the internal system and; Internet protocols for the external system. Hence they can be developed and deployed without huge procurement costs.

The external C2 system is available to relevant members of the international community, including Non-Government Organizations, agencies, foreign government representatives and, of course, the military. This open access is necessary in a typical Peace Operation, where *these parties need to work together as a civil-military coalition confronting non-compliant parties*.

Although they are usually led and chaired by civilian members, the military commander has an essential role in such coalitions. Our proposal is that he can greatly improve their confrontational effectiveness by providing them with a *C2 system maintained and facilitated by military staff*. The military should undertake this task for the following reasons, founded in the circumstances of the operation –

- The military provide the ultimate fallback option, if only to cover the withdrawal.
- The military are usually the first coherent organization in theater.
- The military, particularly in the early stages, are present at all confrontations, if only to provide security.
- The military, by providing the "bearer system" for the agencies engaged in the informal coalition of a Peace Support Operation, help to unify activities to the benefit of all.

Each coalition member has access to parts of this external "confrontation database" through interactive card tables – the type of access depending on his level in the hierarchy. In addition to accessing data about confrontations they are involved in, each member can also access confrontations delegated to subordinate coalitions. Figure 8 shows how the top-level confrontation can access the set of all card tables currently "in play" – the Common Operational Picture.

After the top-level coalition has defined and studied its confrontation, they distribute tasks to subordinate coalitions or working groups by giving them objectives in the form of lower-level confrontations. As we move down the organizational hierarchy, junior coalitions flesh out and conduct local confrontations. The staff conducting the Confrontation Analysis facilitate coalition planning sessions at each level, using the results to update the status of each confrontation in the C2 system. As a confrontation unfolds, the changing situation is propagated back through the C2 system to be ultimately reflected in the top-level coalition's card table.

At a given level of command, the C2 system contains a list of all the (possibly linked) confrontations appropriate to that level. It is also possible to view, where appropriate, the intent of the superior-level coalition by reviewing their current card tables. On selecting a confrontation, coalition members are presented with the current card table. Coalition members, assisted by staff, then update the information to reflect new intelligence, analyze current dilemmas (which are automatically identified by the system) and plan or update a confrontation strategy.

Each element of the card table (e.g., policy options, positions, fallback future) is hyperlinked to various information databases (e.g., intelligence, historical information, biographical details, automated "expert" advice on dilemma resolution, etc.). As well as facilitating rapid access to relevant information, the confrontation card table organizes and filters for relevance the deluge of data available in a way that matches users' needs and understanding of the situation – i.e., it transforms meaningless data into useful knowledge. Data is interpreted against an understanding of intent, strategy and tactics.

For each confrontation coalition members are involved in, they need to know –

▪ The threats and promises they are making to non-compliant parties, and the factors that affect their credibility.

▪ The threats and promises non-compliant parties are making to them, and the factors that affect their credibility.

Most of this information is normally held in individuals' heads. The advantages of feeding it into a properly organized C2 database, thereby not only allowing coalition members to monitor, communicate and adjust their confrontational strategy, but also allowing clear up-and-down communication of strategies, are enormous.

So far we have described the external system. What is the function of the internal, military system?

It is *not* primarily a system for confronting non-compliant parties. It is generally an error to think of this as a task for the military. It is typically a task for the military commander at each level to carry out in coalition with civilian agencies. While such confronting is going on, the military commander should use his fighting force primarily for information gathering – while ensuring that it has the materiel,

intelligence, leadership and training for fighting, should that at any time, or at any level, become the main effort.

Meanwhile, there is an important role for the military's internal C2 system for confrontations – to obtain and maintain the involvement of civilian agencies in the needed civil-military coalitions. This, therefore, is the primary role of the second of our two C2 systems. Within this system, civilian agencies are modeled as separate players – in contrast to the external system, which represents them as a single player (a cohesive coalition). The objective is to bring these agencies, which often have conflicting agendas, into alignment with a common aim – confronting the non-compliant parties, via a united front, to make them comply with the will of the international community.

In most respects, the technology and processes underlying the internal and external C2 systems are identical. The differences arise in the specific confrontations being conducted under the two systems. Using the external C2 system, the international community (or its representatives within the civil-military coalition) is conducting the main confrontation with the non-compliant parties. The *internal* C2 system is directed to keeping this coalition cohesive and effective – i.e., it is employed in collaboration planning. Care must be taken to ensure that the coalition partners do not perceive this collaborative planning as manipulation by the military. Nevertheless, this planning needs to be in a separate compartment, if only to prevent the parties to the external confrontation from exploiting weak points in the coalition. And as stated earlier, the military are well placed to deliver this service.

Effective C2 requires more than just an information system. The system we propose should be part of a complete **Mission Capability Package** that is needed (as stressed by Alberts [5]) to fully realize the benefits of Confrontation Analysis as a C2 concept. This package must address (in addition to C4ISR Systems), the Concept of Operations, Command and Force Structures, Training and Education, and Doctrine.

Most of this paper has been concerned with discussing the Concept of Operations for confronting. Each commander works in a civil-military coalition to develop a *confrontation strategy* – a plan for achieving compliance through a sequence of linked confrontations. Confrontation Analysis provides the mechanism to link confrontations hierarchically and temporally – ensuring that each confrontation is conducted with clear objectives, leading to an overall resolution. A major aspect of this is the maintenance of both Main and Contingent objectives throughout the confrontation.

Command Organization in a confrontation must reflect the personal responsibility of commanders and civilian agency representatives, at all levels, for confronting and collaborating. Commanders need to delegate much of the routine associated with maintaining fighting capability, and maintain a small staff to assist them and the civil-military coalition in planning and implementing confrontation strategies.

In a Peace Operation, the emphasis on military versus civilian leadership shifts according to circumstances. Therefore, an approach to managing confrontations must support a shift from military-led confrontations to civilian-led confrontations, and back again, as necessary. With its emphasis on civil-military C2 operations, the system outlined in Figure 8 directly reflects that requirement.

For all these reasons, a theater commander needs a small staff of trained "Confrontation Officers". These need to be readily available at the appropriate level and are not of necessity military. When conflict, not confronting, is the main effort,

they should be supporting Information Operations and contingency planning. In The Gulf War example, it is clear how beneficial this would have been once the shooting stopped. The skills to conduct this analysis and provide support to the commander are very similar to those being considered for Information Warfare staffs.

*Training* in conducting confrontations needs to be provided in military staff colleges and civilian agencies. Confrontation Analysis can be presented at a variety of levels – from a way of thinking to a mathematical theory. As a result, it lends itself to progressively more intensive training, and can be used on a regular basis – allowing practitioners to maintain their skills.

If Confrontation Analysis is to benefit military operations, it needs to be embedded in the appropriate *doctrine*. Confrontation Analysis presents a coherent philosophy for conducting Peace Operations – an area where doctrine has given inadequate support to serving commanders. Meanwhile, the unified theory of war shows how "confronting" fits into general military doctrine. It is an ongoing military activity. During conflict, it mostly provides an input to Information Operations, Public Information and Civil Affairs. In a Peace Operation, it is for most of the time supporting the commander's main effort. At no time is it large or costly in terms of staff or other assets employed. Nevertheless, Confrontational Analysis would crucially enhance the success of a Peace Operation.

## Summary

Confrontation Analysis provides tools for those military operations where force is deployed, rather than *em*ployed, for political purpose, such as Peace Operations. Vital to success in such operations when faced by non-compliant parties is to win a psychological confrontation to change their intentions to the collective will.

Within a unified theory of war, every military operation is seen to be in the service of a confrontation, if considered from a sufficiently high level. In Peace Operations, confronting becomes the main effort for relatively low-level commanders. For the first time, we are able to approach confrontations with tools and concepts appropriate to the task at hand. Increasing our effectiveness in this essential type of military operation will economize on use of military assets and shorten the time in which they have to be employed as a deterrent during transition to civilian rule.

In addition to presenting these arguments, we have outlined the design of a confrontation C2 system, and a Military Capability Package needed to implement it. Through this we hope to demonstrate the theory and practice of effective confrontation.

## References

1.  Quoted in Cockburn, A. and P. – *Out of the Ashes: the Resurrection of Saddam Hussein*, Verso: New York and London, 2000.

2.  Two days after announcing the cease-fire, President Bush gave the following reflection at a White House press conference – "You know, to be very honest with you, I haven't yet felt this wonderfully euphoric feeling that many of the American people feel. And I'm beginning to. I feel much better about it today than I did yesterday. But I think it's that I want to see an end. You mention World War II – there was a definitive end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there – the man who wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors." – Public Papers of

George Bush, Book 1, January 1 to June 30, 1991, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict", March 1, 1991, p. 201.

3.  In speeches on February 15th, President Bush called for the Iraqi military and people to overthrow Saddam. Following the war, in April, during his press conference on the decision to send troops to defend the Kurds against Saddam, the President "casually" announced that sanctions against Iraq would continue until Saddam was removed. See Cockburn, op. cit., p.33. The President's casual remark attracted little comment. By that time it was almost obvious.

4.  Based on de la Billiere, P. – *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War*, HarperCollins, London, 1992.

5.  See Alberts, D. S., *The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies*, NDU Press, Washington DC, 1996.